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PROTECTING OLDER AMERICANS WORKING FOR
FOREIGN EMPLOYERS FROM AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
Lisa A. Buder-Brust
INTRODUCTION
As the American population ages, the percentage of workers over
the age of forty continues to rise.' At the same time, increasing num-
bers of businesses are expanding globally2 resulting in more Ameri-
cans employed in the United States by foreign-owned companies.3
The combination of these two trends will lead to an growing number
of Americans over the age of forty employed by foreign employers4 in
1. The percentage of Americans over the age of 40 has risen from 36.3% in 1970
to 40.2% in 1995. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1996, at 15 (116th ed. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Statistical Abstract]. The U.S. Census
Bureau estimates that 45% of the population will be over the age of 40 by 2005. Id. at
17. The share of Americans over the age of 40, therefore, will increase by more over
the next decade-from 1995 to 2005-than it did over the 25 years from 1970 to 1995.
See id. at 15, 17. See generally 1 Howard C. Eglit, Age Discrimination § 1.03, at 1-13
to 1-14 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1 Eglit] (describing the "graying" of the American
population).
2. For example, the foreign direct investment position in the United States rose
from $83 billion in 1980 to $464 billion in 1993, an increase of almost 460%. 1996
Statistical Abstract, supra note 1, at 788. The U.S. direct investment position abroad
rose from $215 billion in 1980 to $560 billion in 1993, an increase of 160%. id. at 791;
see also Alan Gladstone, Transnational Application of Title VII Employment Protec-
tions: A Two-Sided Coin, 6 Int'l Legal Persp. 1, 1-2 (1994) (describing the increasing
globalization of business); Linda Maher, Drawing Circles in die Sand Extraterritorial-
ity in Civil Rights Legislation After ARAMCO and die Civil Rights Act of 1991, 9
Conn. J. Int'l L. 1, 1 (1993) (same); Lairold M. Street, Application of U.S. Fair Em-
ployment Laws to Transnational Employers in the United States and Abroad, 19
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & PoL 357, 358 (1987) (same).
3. In 1981, foreign-owned businesses employed slightly over 2.4 million Ameri-
cans in the United States. 1996 Statistical Abstract, supra note 1, at 789. This number
nearly doubled by 1993, when close to 4.7 million Americans were employed by for-
eign-owned businesses in the United States, representing nearly 4.9% of all American
workers employed. Id.; see also Gladstone, supra note 2, at 2 (describing the impact
the globalization of business has had on the number of Americans working for foreign
employers in the United States).
4. In this Note, "foreign employers" refers to two categories of employers that
are not domestic employers. First, a "foreign employer" is a subsidiary or division
located, but not incorporated, in the United States that is owned and operated by a
foreign firm. Second, a "foreign employer" is a foreign parent of a U.S.-incorporated
subsidiary. In this situation, the U.S.-incorporated subsidiary is a domestic employer
and the foreign parent is a foreign employer. This Note focuses on the applicability of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to both categories of foreign
employers in the United States. See infra part I.B.
The ADEA defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(1994). A person is defined as "one or more individuals, partnerships, associations,
labor organizations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any organ-
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the United States. Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 19675 ("ADEA") protects such employees, therefore, is an is-
sue of great importance to many older Americans.6
Several courts faced with this issue have correctly interpreted the
ADEA as enforceable against foreign employers in the United
States.7 Under such an interpretation, older Americans working for
foreign employers in the United States are afforded the same protec-
tion under the ADEA as older Americans working for domestic em-
ployers.8 Unfortunately, two federal courts have disagreed with this
conclusion and, instead, have interpreted the ADEA as unenforceable
against foreign employers in the United States.9 Under this interpre-
ized groups of persons." 29 U.S.C. § 630(a). The ADEA is enforceable against all
corporations incorporated in the United States. See Michael Starr, Who's the Boss?
The Globalization of U.S. Employment Law, 51 Bus. Law. 635, 638-39 (1996); see also
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982) (stating that U.S.-
incorporated companies are domestic corporations and "subject to the responsibilities
of other domestic corporations").
5. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
6. The ADEA covers American citizens, as well as non-citizens, who are at least
40 years old. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (defining "employee" as "an individual employed
by any employer") (emphasis added); Daniel P. O'Meara, Protecting the Growing
Number of Older Workers: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 59 (1989)
(stating that the ADEA covers American citizens and foreign nationals working
within the United States); see, e.g., Kim v. Dial Serv. Int'l, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3327
(DLC), 1997 WL 5902 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1997) (allowing a Korean national to proceed
with an ADEA claim against his employer located in the United States). With regard
to foreign workplaces, the ADEA covers only U.S. citizens employed by U.S. employ-
ers; foreign nationals working for U.S. employers outside the United States are not
covered. S. Rep. No. 467, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3009-10 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 467]; see Louise P. Zanar, Recent
Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 19 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L.
& Econ. 165, 181 (1985). This Note focuses on the ADEA protection afforded Amer-
icans who are 40 or older ("older Americans") and employed by foreign employers in
the United States, and does not focus on this issue with respect to non-citizens.
7. See Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1006, 1008-09 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (concluding that a foreign parent of a U.S.-incorporated subsidiary could be
held liable under the ADEA if the parent and subsidiary were an "integrated enter-
prise" and the total of the subsidiary's employees and the parent's employees located
in the United States met the statutory minimum of 20 employees); EEOC v. Kloster
Cruise Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 147, 151-52 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that a foreign employer
in the United States was subject to the ADEA); Helm v. South African Airways, No.
84 Civ. 5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1987) (finding that the
ADEA was applicable to foreign employers in the United States); see also O'Meara,
supra note 6, at 59 (stating that "[a]ll persons, foreign and American, working within
the territorial borders of the United States for any employer, foreign or American,
are covered by the ADEA"); Robert P. Lewis, Does the ADEA Cover Foreign Em-
ployers Operating in the United States?, N.Y. L.J., July 15, 1996, at 1, 6 (describing the
disagreement among courts on whether the ADEA applies to foreign employers in
the United States and concluding that the more reasonable interpretation is that it is
applicable to such employers).
8. See cases cited supra note 7.
9. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 827 F. Supp. 915, 920-21
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (concluding that the ADEA does not apply to foreign employers
operating in the United States), affd on other grounds, 21 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1994);
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tation, the ADEA does not protect older Americans working for for-
eign employers in the United States, but rather only protects those
Americans working for domestic firms. ° Older Americans that are
discriminated against in these jurisdictions have no legal redress in the
United States."
These polar interpretations resulted from amendments made to the
ADEA by the Older Americans Act Amendments of 198412
("OAAA"). Through the OAAA, Congress sought to overrule a
number of court decisions that concluded that the ADEA did not
cover U.S. companies employing American citizens abroad.1 3 Con-
gress intended the amendments to extend ADEA coverage to Ameri-
can citizens working for U.S. employers abroad.'4 To make clear that
the OAAA did not affect foreign firms employing U.S. citizens
abroad, Congress added the following language to the ADEA: "The
prohibitions of [the ADEA] shall not apply where the employer is a
foreign person not controlled by an American employer."" With this
addition, Congress intended only to put a limit on the extension of the
ADEA extraterritorially, not to create an ADEA exemption for all
foreign employers, including those located in the United States. 6
As this Note demonstrates, foreign employers in the United States
should be held to the ADEA's prohibitions for several reasons. First,
the OAAA legislative history is devoid of an intention to rescind
ADEA coverage for older Americans working for foreign employers
in the United States. 7 Second, Congress expressly acknowledged the
Mochelle v. J. Walter Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1302, 1309 (M.D. La. 1993) (concluding that
the foreign parent of a U.S. employer could not be held liable under the ADEA
because as a foreign company, it was exempt from the ADEA), aff d, 15 F.3d 1079(5th Cir. 1994); see also Lewis, supra note 7, at 1, 6 (discussing two federal courts that
refused to apply the ADEA to foreign employers in the United States).
10. See supra note 9.
11. See supra note 9.
12. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802, 98 Stat.
1767, 1792.
13. 130 Cong. Rec. 14,213 (1984) (Senator Grassley stating that the OAAA were
intended to extend ADEA coverage to American companies operating abroad in re-
spouse to several court decisions that created a "loophole" for such companies); see
infra part I.B.
14. 130 Cong. Rec. 14,213 (1984) (statement of Senator Grassley); S. Rep. No.
467, supra note 6, at 36-37, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3009-10.
15. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (1994)).
16. S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 36-37, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3009-
10.
17. See S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27-28, 36-37, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000-01, 3009-10; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1037, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3037 [hereinafter H.R. Conf Rep. No.
1037]; 130 Cong. Rec. 14,205-17 (1984) (OAAA considered and passed by the Sen-
ate); 130 Cong. Rec. 23,032-36 (1984) (OAAA considered and passed by the House);
130 Cong. Rec. 26,956-64, 27,337-50 (1984) (Senate and House agreed to a conference
report); Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing Before the Sub-
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sovereignty of other nations by tolerating non-compliance with the
ADEA by U.S. employers abroad when compliance would violate the
laws of the host country. 18 This is inconsistent with Congress ceding
U.S. sovereignty over foreign employers in the United States. Third,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the ad-
ministrative agency charged with enforcing the ADEA, has inter-
preted the ADEA as applicable to foreign employers in the United
States.19 Finally, both the ADEA and Title VII, which proscribes dis-
crimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, and na-
tional origin, should be applied consistently to foreign employers in
the United States.2 °
Part I of this Note describes the ADEA and the court decisions that
led Congress to amend it with the OAAA. Part II explains the
OAAA and traces the court decisions interpreting the ADEA's appli-
cability to foreign employers in the United States after the OAAA.
Part III reviews the arguments for enforcing the ADEA against for-
eign employers in the United States. This Note concludes that the
ADEA should apply to such employers.
I. THE ADEA PRIOR TO THE OAAA
The ADEA was enacted in 1967 to prevent age discrimination in
employment and to promote the fair treatment of older Americans in
the workplace.2 ' The ADEA prohibits employers from engaging in
age-based discriminatory practices in hiring and discharging employ-
ees, and in setting the terms and conditions of employment.22 Prior to
the enactment of the OAAA, which extended ADEA coverage to
American citizens working for U.S. employers abroad, courts assumed
that the ADEA covered foreign employers in the United States as
well as domestic employers.23
A. Background and Purpose of the ADEA
In enacting the ADEA, Congress recognized that many employers
were setting "arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job per-
comm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-48 (1983) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1).
19. EEOC Policy Guidance: Application of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 to American Firms Overseas, Their
Overseas Subsidiaries, and Foreign Firms, No. N-915.039, at 3 (Mar. 3, 1989) [herein-
after EEOC Policy Guidance].
20. See infra part III.D.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 621; see Charles D. Edelman & Ilene C. Siegler, Federal Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Law: Slowing Down the Gold Watch 73 (1978);
O'Meara, supra note 6, at 76.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); see Edelman & Siegler, supra note 21, at 85-88.
23. See infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
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formance" which made it difficult for older Americans to gain and
retain employment.' The purposes of the ADEA were to help older
persons receive fair treatment in the workplace and to promote the
employment of older Americans.' Congress hoped the ADEA
would encourage employers to recognize ability rather than age in the
employment of older persons.27
Under the ADEA, an employer may not refuse to hire or discharge
an individual, or deprive an individual of employment opportunities
on the basis of age.' In addition, employers subject to the ADEA
may not discriminate against an individual with respect to compensa-
tion, terms, or conditions of employment on the basis of age. 9 The
ADEA defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each work-
ing day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year."3 An employer that incorporates in the
United States is considered a domestic corporation for purposes of
ADEA coverage.3' The ADEA defines an employee as "an individ-
ual employed by any employer ' 32 who is age forty and over?3
The EEOC is charged with enforcing the ADEA as well as the
other U.S. discrimination laws? 4 When enacted in 1967, the ADEA
specified the Department of Labor as the agency responsible for its
administration and enforcement. 35 In 1978, President Carter trans-
ferred this authority to the EEOC.36  Congress delegated to the
EEOC the power to issue legislative rules and regulations that it
24. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1); see Edelman & Siegler, supra note 21, at 73.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a)(1), 621(a)(3); see 1 Eglit, supra note 1, § 2.01, at 2-1.
27. H. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2213, 2214 [hereinafter H. Rep. No. 805].
28. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a).
29. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). This definition also includes agents of an employer, states
and their political subdivisions, and interstate agencies, but excludes the United States
or any corporation that it wholly owns. ld.
31. See supra note 4 (explaining the definition of "employer" for ADEA
purposes).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0. The term "employee" excludes any person elected to a
public office of a state or its political subdivision or any person appointed by such an
officer to carry out the powers of the office. This exemption, however, does not apply
to employees covered by the civil service laws of a state government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision, Id.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 628; see also Starr, supra note 4, at 637 (explaining that the EEOC
is responsible for enforcing the "major U.S. employment discrimination laws"); Re-
becca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy:
Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 Utah L Rev.
51,66-68 (1995) (describing the reorganization plan that established the EEOC as the
agency charged with enforcing federal job discrimination laws).
35. 1 Eglit, supra note 1, § 2.03, at 2-10.
36. Id. §2.03, at 2-11.
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deemed necessary to enforce the ADEA.37 This delegation carries
with it "an implied delegation of interpretive authority. '38 In accord-
ance with this interpretive authority, the EEOC issues interpretations
of the provisions of the ADEA and the other discrimination stat-
utes.39 These interpretations aid courts reviewing issues on which
Congress has not expressly spoken, such as whether the ADEA ap-
plies to foreign employers in the United States.40 The EEOC has con-
cluded that the ADEA is enforceable against foreign employers in the
United States.41 Courts are directed to defer to the EEOC's interpre-
tation, but the degree of deference required is unclear.42 The
Supreme Court has developed two approaches to determine the de-
gree of deference to be given to administrative agencies' interpreta-
tions. 3 The first approach requires a court to treat the agency
interpretation as persuasive.44 The second approach requires a court
to treat it as controlling when the statute is ambiguous and the agency
interpretation is reasonable.45 The degree of deference to be given to
the EEOC's interpretations is unsettled because the Supreme Court
has not consistently applied either standard to the EEOC's interpreta-
tions.46 As demonstrated in part III.C.2 of this Note, under either
standard, the EEOC's interpretation with respect to foreign employ-
ers in the United States is entitled to substantial deference from the
courts.4 7
37. 29 U.S.C. § 628; see White, supra note 34, at 51-53. The EEOC, however, does
not have "cease-and-desist" authority and, therefore, cannot issue enforceable orders
or determine liability. White, supra note 34, at 91.
38. See White, supra note 34, at 89.
39. 1 Eglit, supra note 1, § 2.03, at 2-12; see White, supra note 34, at 103; see, e.g.,
EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 1-5 (interpreting liability of foreign employ-
ers in the United States and U.S. employers abroad under the ADEA and Equal Pay
Act).
40. See White, supra note 34, at 52-54.
41. See EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 3.
42. See infra part III.C.1 (tracing the Supreme Court's recent decisions involving
the degree of deference to be given to EEOC interpretations).
43. See infra part III.C.1 (discussing the two degrees of deference that courts ac-
cord EEOC interpretations).
44. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see infra part III.C.1 (dis-
cussing the two approaches courts use to determine the degree of deference to be
given to agency interpretations).
45. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984); see infra part III.C.1 (discussing the two approaches courts use to deter-
mine the degree of deference to be given to agency interpretations).
46. Compare EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (finding
that an EEOC interpretation of Title VII was entitled to only persuasive value) with
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1988) (finding that an
EEOC interpretation of Title VII was entitled to judicial deference and binding on
the Court); see also White, supra note 34, at 54 (noting that the Supreme Court has
not confirmed which deference standard to apply to EEOC interpretations).
47. See infra part III.C.2 (arguing that the EEOC's interpretation that the ADEA
applies to foreign employers in the United States is entitled to judicial deference).
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Prior to the OAAA, courts assumed that the ADEA covered for-
eign employers operating in the United States." For example in
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,4 9 the court assumed that the ADEA
applied to a Korean corporation employing an American citizen in the
United States.50 In MacNamara, the court held that the "employee of
choice" provision in the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
("FCN") Treaty"' between the United States and Korea precluded the
plaintiff employee from bringing a disparate impact claim, but not a
disparate treatment claim, under Title VII and the ADEA.52
MacNamara, an American citizen, worked as a sales manager in the
United States for Korean Air Lines ("KAL"). 3 After working for
KAL for approximately eight years, KAL terminated MacNamara at
the age of fifty-seven in June of 1982.1 MacNamara claimed that he
was discriminated against based on his race and national origin under
Title VII and based on his age under the ADEA.55 KAL argued that
48. See, e.g., MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988)
(assuming that a Korean corporation employing an American citizen in the United
States could be liable under the ADEA for disparate treatment discrimination that
occurred prior to the OAAA, but not disparate impact discrimination which was pro-
tected by the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
904 (1989); Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1183-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(concluding that if the plaintiff could prove that his U.S. employer and its Danish
parent were an "integrated enterprise," then the Danish parent could also be liable
for the alleged age discrimination); see also Helm v. South African Airways, No. 84
Civ. 5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that the ADEA was
applicable to foreign employers in the United States). The discrimination in Helm
occurred before the OAAA. The court noted that even if the OAAA exempted for-
eign employers from coverage, the pre-amendment ADEA applied to foreign em-
ployers and the amendments were not retroactive. ldL The court stated in dictum that
it did not interpret the OAAA to exempt foreign employers in the United States from
ADEA coverage. ld.
49. 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988).
50. Id. at 1147-48.
51. Article VIII(1) of the Korean FCN Treaty provides, in part, -[n)ationals and
companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the
other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys,
agents and other specialists of their choice." Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, U.S.-Korea, art. VIII(l), 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2223.
52. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48. An age discrimination claim may be based
on either of two theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact. Joseph E. Kalet,
Age Discrimination in Employment Law 59 (1986). Disparate treatment involves em-
ployment practices or policies that intentionally disfavor individuals based on their
age. Id. Disparate impact involves employment practices that are neutral on their
face, but adversely affect older Americans more than other employees and have no
business justification. Id
The lower court dismissed MacNamara's claims on the ground that the FCN Treaty
allowed KAL to replace MacNamara with a Korean national without regard to U.S.
employment laws. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, No. Civ. A. 82-5085, 1987 WL
19606, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 1987). KAL did not raise as a possible defense that the ADEA
or Title VII was inapplicable to foreign employers. See id. at "1.
53. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1137.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1138.
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Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty allowed it to replace MacNamara
with an executive from its own country without being subject to the
restrictions of Title VII or the ADEA.56 The court concluded that
MacNamara could bring a claim under Title VII and the ADEA pro-
vided the claim was for disparate treatment and not disparate im-
pact.57 The court reasoned that Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty
only protected KAL from claims of disparate impact that resulted
from its employment decisions.58 The treaty did not protect KAL
from intentional acts of discrimination under Title VII or the
ADEA.59 The court assumed that the ADEA applied to a foreign
corporation employing an American citizen in the United States by
allowing MacNamara to proceed with his disparate treatment claim
under the ADEA against KAL.6 °
B. Application of the ADEA to U.S. Employers Abroad-Impetus
for the OAAA
As American businesses expanded globally, increasing numbers of
Americans were employed in foreign subsidiaries of U.S. employers.61
Prior to the enactment of the OAAA, the ADEA did not explicitly
state whether it applied to American citizens working overseas for
U.S. employers.62 When the issue arose, the majority of courts re-
fused to apply the ADEA to American employers operating in for-
eign locations.63 Seven of the federal circuit courts were faced with
this issue in ADEA suits brought by American citizens working for
56. Id
57. Id. at 1147-48. For a discussion of the MacNamara decision and its impact on
employment discrimination law when FCN Treaties are involved, see Eric Allen Gras-
berger, Note, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution to Foreign Em-
ployer Job Discrimination Under FCN Treaty Rights, 16 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
141 (1991) and William P. Weiner, Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion-Subsequently Enacted Legislation-Civil Rights Act of 1964-Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967: MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 84 Am. J. Int'l L.
565 (1990).
58. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147-48.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Gladstone, supra note 2, at 1-2.
62. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; H.
Rep. No. 805, supra note 27, at 1, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2214; Zanar,
supra note 6, at 168.
63. See Lopez v. Pan Am World Servs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1118, 1119-20 (11th Cir.
1987) (holding that, prior to the OAAA, the ADEA did not protect Americans em-
ployed by U.S. employers in foreign locations and that the amendments were not
retroactive); S.F. DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th
Cir. 1986) (same); Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(same); Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1985) (same);
Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the ADEA did not protect Americans employed by U.S. employers in foreign loca-
tions); Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984) (same);
Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1984) (same).
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U.S. employers abroad.' All seven courts interpreted the ADEA as
lacking extraterritorial application.' The basis for this conclusion was
that the ADEA incorporated by reference a provision in the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 193866 ("FLSA") which provided that employ-
ees working in foreign locations were excluded from coverage. 67 The
courts interpreting the ADEA assumed that Congress did not intend
the ADEA to apply extraterritorially because it expressly incorpo-
rated the FLSA exemption into the ADEA.1 Thus, prior to 1984, the
only legal redress for Americans working abroad against their U.S.
employers for age discrimination was under the age discrimination
laws of the country in which they were working.69
In 1984, Congress passed the OAAA which made several amend-
ments to the ADEA.70 The purpose of the ADEA amendments was
to extend ADEA coverage to American citizens employed in the for-
eign offices of U.S. employers.71
II. Ti- OAAA AND ITS EFFECt ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE ADEA
The OAAA extended coverage of the ADEA to American citizens
working overseas for U.S. employers. 72 To make clear that the
64. See supra note 63.
65. See supra note 63.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
67. See Lopez, 813 F.2d at 1119; S.F. DeYoreo, 785 F.2d at 1283; Ralis, 770 F.2d at
1122; Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 555-56; Zahourek, 750 F.2d at 828-29 & n.*; Cleary, 728 F.2d
at 608-09. Section 626(b) of the ADEA provides that "[tihe provisions of this chapter
shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided
in section[ I . .. 216 . . . of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Section 216, an FLSA
provision, provides that "no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment
... [for] failure to comply with any provision... of this chapter... with respect to
work... performed in a workplace to which the exemption in section 213(f) of this
title is applicable." 29 U.S.C. § 216(d). FLSA § 213(f) excludes from coverage "any
employee whose services during the workweek are performed in a workplace within a
foreign country." 29 U.S.C. § 213(f); see also Zanar, supra note 6, at 168 (explaining
that the ADEA incorporated an FLSA provision that indirectly addresses
extraterritoriality).
68. See Lopez, 813 F.2d at 1119; S.F. DeYoreo, 785 F.2d at 1283; Ralis, 770 F.2d at
1122; Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 555-56; Zahourek, 750 F.2d at 828-29 & n.*; Cleary, 728 F.2d
at 608-09.
69. In Cleary, however, the country in which the plaintiff was working, England,
did not have laws prohibiting age discrimination. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 608 n.3; see also
Zanar, supra note 6, at 165-66 (noting that before the OAAA, Americans suffering
age discrimination by U.S. employers abroad had legal redress only under foreign
law).
70. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802, 98 Stat. at 1792.
71. See S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27-28, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3000-01; 130 Cong. Rec. 14,213 (1984) (Senator Grassley stating that the purpose of
the ADEA amendments was to bring Americans working abroad for U.S. employers
under the provisions of the ADEA); Zanar, supra note 6, at 166.
72. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802, 98 Stat. at 1792; see Michelle J.
Ledina, Comment, The Multinational Enterprise and Title VIk: Equal Employment
2543
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
OAAA did not cover U.S. citizens working for foreign firms overseas,
Congress added a subsection stating that the ADEA did not apply to
a foreign employer not controlled by an American employer.73 Con-
gress intended this subsection as a limit to the ADEA's extraterritori-
ality, not an ADEA exemption for all foreign employers, including
those located in the United States.74 Several courts interpreting the
ADEA after its amendment correctly concluded that the OAAA did
not provide an exemption for foreign employers in the United States,
but rather affected only U.S. employers abroad. Two federal courts,
however, inappropriately interpreted the language of the ADEA
amendments to exempt all foreign employers from ADEA coverage
including those operating in the United States.76
A. The OAAA
The OAAA amended the ADEA in response to the several court
decisions that prohibited its application to U.S. employers abroad.77
First, the OAAA amended the definition of "employee" to include
American citizens working for employers in foreign countries.78 Prior
to the OAAA, the ADEA defined "employee" as "an individual em-
ployed by any employer."79 The OAAA added: "The term 'em-
ployee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the United States
employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country."80
While this amendment does not specifically address whether non-U.S.
Opportunities for Americans at Home and Abroad, 4 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 373, 381
(1990); Zanar, supra note 6, at 166.
73. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2)).
74. See S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27-28, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3000-01 (stating that because of the "well-established principle[s] of sovereignty...
the amendment is carefully worded to apply only to citizens of the United States who
are working for U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries"); infra part H.A (arguing that
the legislative history indicates that the OAAA was intended solely to extend the
ADEA extraterritorially).
75. See cases cited infra note 88 (listing several cases in which courts interpreted
the ADEA after its amendment as enforceable against foreign employers in the
United States).
76. See cases cited infra note 92 (listing two federal courts that interpreted the
ADEA after its amendment as unenforceable against foreign employers in the United
States).
77. See 130 Cong. Rec. 14,213 (1984) (Senator Grassley stating that the OAAA
were intended to extend ADEA coverage to American companies operating abroad
in response to several court decisions that created a "loophole" for such companies);
Zanar, supra note 6, at 165-66 (explaining that Congress amended the ADEA in re-
sponse to court decisions that held that the ADEA was inapplicable when the rele-
vant workplace was outside the United States). For the cases that the OAAA
overruled, see supra note 63.
78. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802(a), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as
amended 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)); see Zanar, supra note 6, at 181.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0.
80. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802(a), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)).
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citizens are covered, the Senate Report explains that the amendment
relates only to "any individual who is a citizen of the United States
employed by a U.S. employer in a workplace in a foreign country."8'
Concurrently, Congress added 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) which provides,
in part:
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorpo-
ration is in a foreign country, any practice by such corporation pro-
hibited under [the ADEA] shall be presumed to be such practice by
such employer.
(2) The prohibitions of [the ADEA] shall not apply where the
employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American
employer. 82
Section 623(h)(3) establishes the following test to determine whether
an employer controls a foreign corporation: "(A) interrelation of op-
erations, (B) common management, (C) centralized control of labor
relations, and (D) common ownership or financial control, of the em-
ployer and the corporation."' Congress also amended the ADEA to
exempt U.S. employers in foreign locations from complying with the
ADEA where compliance would violate the laws of the host
country.84
Through the OAAA, Congress hoped to "insure that the citizens of
the United States who are employed in a foreign workplace by U.S.
corporations or their subsidiaries enjoy the protections of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act."' s Thus, the OAAA clarified the
issue of the ADEA's extraterritorial reach.' After the OAAA, the
ADEA protected American citizens working for U.S. employers
abroad from age discrimination. 7
81. S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 36, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3009;
see Zanar, supra note 6, at 181.
82. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(1)-(2)).
83. Id. (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(3)).
84. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1)).
85. S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000;
see Zanar, supra note 6, at 166.
86. See Zanar, supra note 6, at 196-97; see e.g., Lopez v. Pan Am World Services,
Inc., 813 F.2d 1118, 1119 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that the ADEA as
amended by the OAAA would apply to a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent that
engaged in age discrimination against a U.S. citizen, but did not apply retroactively to
such a claim that arose prior to its amendment); S.F. DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the ADEA amend-
ments, extending the Act's reach extraterritorially, did not apply to a claim arising
prior to the effective date of the amendments).
87. See Zanar, supra note 6, at 196-97.
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B. Interpretation of the ADEA's Coverage of Foreign Employers in
the United States After the OAAA
After the enactment of the OAAA, several courts correctly inter-
preted the ADEA amendments to affect only U.S. employers operat-
ing abroad.' These courts interpreted § 623(h)(2) as a limit to the
ADEA's extraterritorial reach.89 Under such an interpretation, Con-
gress added § 623(h)(2) to make clear that the ADEA did not apply
to American citizens working for foreign employers in foreign loca-
tions. 90 These courts refused to interpret the OAAA as creating an
exemption for foreign employers in the United States, and therefore
held them to the ADEA's prohibitions. 91 Two federal courts, how-
ever, interpreting § 623(h)(2) in isolation, wrongly found that it ex-
empts from ADEA coverage all foreign employers, including those
operating in the United States.92
88. See Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) to mean that a foreign parent's employees in the
United States, but not its employees outside the United States, may be included in the
statutory minimum of 20 employees if the parent and subsidiary are an "integrated
enterprise"); EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 147, 151 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(holding that 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) "fine-tuned Congress' extension of the ADEA so
that the statute did not govern the foreign operations of foreign companies"); Helm v.
South African Airways, No. 84 Civ. 5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June
25, 1987) (finding that 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) was intended to clarify Congress's inten-
tion not "to impose its labor standards on another country" (quoting S. Rep. 467,
supra note 6, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000)); see also Lewis, supra
note 7, at 6 (noting two federal courts that applied the ADEA to a foreign employer
in the United States).
89. See cases cited supra note 88.
90. See cases cited supra note 88.
91. See Robins, 914 F. Supp. at 1009 (concluding that a foreign parent of a U.S.-
incorporated subsidiary could be held liable under the ADEA if the parent and sub-
sidiary were an "integrated enterprise" and the total of the subsidiary's employees
and the parent's employees located in the United States met the statutory nmimum
of 20 employees); Kloster Cruise, 888 F. Supp. at 151-52 (holding that a foreign em-
ployer operating in the United States was not exempt from ADEA coverage); Helm
at *7 (finding that the ADEA was applicable to foreign employers in the United
States); see also O'Meara, supra note 6, at 59 (stating that the ADEA applies to all
employers, foreign and domestic, working within the territorial borders of the United
States).
92. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 827 F. Supp. 915, 920
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) clearly excludes foreign employ-
ers from ADEA coverage), affd on other grounds, 21 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1994);
Mochelle v. J. Walter Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1302, 1309 (M.D. La. 1993) (concluding that
the foreign parent of a U.S. employer is "specifically excluded from ADEA liability
under 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2)"), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1079 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Lewis,
supra note 7, at 6 (criticizing the decisions of two federal courts refusing to apply the
ADEA to a foreign employer in the United States).
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1. After the OAAA-Courts Interpreting the ADEA to Cover
Foreign Employers in the United States
After enactment of the OAAA, several courts correctly concluded
that the ADEA is enforceable against foreign employers in the
United States.93 In EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd.,9 the court found
that a foreign corporation operating in the United States was subject
to the ADEA.95 Kloster Cruise Ltd. ("Kloster Cruise"), a Bermuda
subsidiary of a Norwegian company, maintained a sales office in Flor-
ida.96 As part of a reduction in its workforce, Kloster Cruise termi-
nated five of its Florida office employees, all American citizens over
the age of forty.97 The EEOC, believing that Kloster Cruise termi-
nated these individuals in violation of the ADEA, filed suit on their
behalf.98 Kloster Cruise defended its actions on the ground that
§ 623(h)(2) specifically exempted it from the ADEA.99
The court disagreed with Kloster Cruise's position, finding instead
that § 623(h)(2) was intended by Congress to limit the extraterritorial
application of the ADEA. °0 0 The court interpreted § 623(h)(2) in
light of the other ADEA amendments made by the OAAA and their
legislative history, refusing to simply interpret § 623(h)(2) in isola-
tion.1' 1 The court noted that if read in isolation, § 623(h)(2) would
exempt all foreign corporations wherever located.102 The court recog-
nized, however, that unless it interpreted § 623(h)(2) as a limit to the
extraterritorial application of the ADEA, the other amendments ex-
ceeded Congress's legislative reach. 10 3 For example, the OAAA
amended the definition of "employee" to include American citizens
employed in a foreign workplace."m Read literally, this could extend
coverage of the ADEA to foreign employers in foreign countries. 05
The court recognized that Congress did not intend to infringe on the
sovereignty of other nations in enacting the ADEA amendments."
93. See cases cited supra note 88 (listing several cases in which courts interpreted
the ADEA after its amendment as enforceable against foreign employers in the
United States).
94. 888 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
95. Id. at 151-52.
96. Il at 148.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 148-49.
100. Id. at 151.
101. Id. at 150-51.
102. Id. at 151.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 150.
105. Id. at 151.
106. Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27-28, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000 (stating that because of sovereignty principles, the ADEA does
not apply to foreign nationals working for U.S. employers abroad or U.S. citizens
working for foreign corporations abroad).
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The court, therefore, interpreted § 623(h)(2) as a clarification of this
intent, rather than as an exemption for all foreign employers.' °7
The Kloster court also relied on the EEOC's policy guidance which
supported its interpretation that the ADEA applied to foreign em-
ployers in the United States.0 8 The court found that the EEOC's in-
terpretation was consistent with the other ADEA amendments made
by the OAAA, comported with the overall purpose of the ADEA,
and did not unnecessarily limit application of the ADEA. 0 9 As a re-
sult, the court found that the EEOC's policy guidance was entitled to
deference." 0
In Helm v. South African Airways,"' the court also held that a for-
eign employer was subject to the ADEA." 2 Helm was employed in
the United States by South African Airways ("SAA") headquartered
in Johannesburg, South Africa." 3 SAA's pension plan required all
employees to retire at age sixty-two, unless local law provided other-
wise, in which case the local law would prevail. 1 4 SAA asked Helm
to retire at the age of sixty-three after seven years with the com-
pany. 1 5 SAA automatically rehired him because U.S. law required
retirement at age sixty-five." 6 SAA, however, would not allow Helm
to continue his participation in the company's pension plan. 17 Helm
claimed that SAA's termination of his pension plan participation vio-
lated the ADEA." 8
The court in Helm denied SAA's motion for summary judgment
which argued that the ADEA did not apply to foreign employers." 9
The court found "nothing in the ADEA or its legislative history to
indicate that the 1984 amendments were intended to exclude Ameri-
can citizens working within the United States from coverage."' 20 The
court noted that the ADEA applied to "discriminatory acts in places
over which the United States has sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction,
or legislative control.'' The court also noted that the location of the
employee's work station determines applicability of the ADEA.122
107. Kloster Cruise, 888 F. Supp. at 150-51; see EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note
19, at 3.
108. Kloster Cruise, 888 F. Supp. at 149-50, 151-52.
109. Id. at 151-52.
110. Id at 150.
111. No. 84 Civ. 5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1987).
112. Id. at *7.
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id. at *7.
120. Id.
121. Id (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 860.20 (1986)).
122. Id. (citing Wolf v. J.I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 863 (E.D. Wis. 1985)).
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Thus, the ADEA applied to SAA because it employed Helm in the
United States. 123
After the OAAA, courts also applied the ADEA to foreign parents
of U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries for purposes of meeting the
ADEA's twenty-employee threshold.1 4 Employers that are incorpo-
rated in the United States, even if wholly-owned by a foreign parent,
are subject to the ADEA.125 Plaintiffs often try to join the foreign
parents of their U.S. employers when the U.S. employer does not have
the minimum of twenty employees required by the ADEA.'2 6 In or-
der to do so, the plaintiff must show that the parent and subsidiary are
an "integrated enterprise."'1 27 In cases where an "integrated enter-
prise" has been proven, several courts have then allowed the aggrega-
tion of the U.S. employer's employees and the foreign parent's
employees in the United States to determine if the statutory minimum
is met.12 These courts interpreted § 623(h)(2) to require only the in-
clusion of the foreign parent's employees in the United States and not
the global total of the foreign parent's employees. 29 They refused,
however, to interpret § 623(h)(2) as a complete exemption for foreign
employers. 30
For example, in Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc. 131 Robins
worked for Max Mara U.S.A., a Delaware corporation. 32 Max Mara
U.S.A. ("Max Mara") was wholly owned by Max Mara Fashion
Group, SpA ("Fashion Group"), a corporation organized under Ital-
123. Id
124. See Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Rao v. Kenya Airways, Ltd., No. 94 Civ. 6103 (CSH), 1995 WL 366305, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1995).
125. See Kim v. Dial Serv. Int'l, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3327 (DLC), 1997 WL 5902, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1997) (noting that a U.S.-incorporated employer, wholly-owned by a
foreign parent, could be sued under the ADEA if it employed the statutory minimum
of 20 employees); Robins, 914 F. Supp. at 1009 (same); Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc.,
470 F. Supp. 1181, 1182-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (concluding that plaintiffs U.S.-incorpo-
rated employer, wholly-owned by a Danish parent, could be liable under the ADEA);
see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 188 (1982) (stating that
U.S.-incorporated companies are domestic corporations and "subject to the responsi-
bilities of other domestic corporations").
126. The ADEA requires that an employer have at least 20 employees to be subject
to the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). For cases where a plaintiff tried to join a foreign
parent to reach the statutory minimum, see Kim, 1997 WL 5902, at *3; Robins, 914 F.
Supp. at 1009; Mochelle v. J. Walter Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1302, 1307-08 (M.D. La. 1993).
127. Courts usually look to the following four factors to determine if two or more
entities are an "integrated enterprise": "(1) the interrelatedness of the businesses'
operations; (2) whether there is common management of the various entities; (3)
whether there is centralized control of labor relations; and (4) whether there is com-
mon ownership of the businesses." Regan v. In the Heat of the Nite, Inc., No. 93 Civ.
862 (KMW), 1995 WL 413249, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1995).
128. See Kim, 1997 WL 5902, at *3; Robins, 914 F. Supp. at 1008.
129. See supra note 128.
130. Id
131. 914 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
132. Id at 1007.
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ian law.133 Robins made several claims of discrimination against his
employer, including that he was terminated because of his age in vio-
lation of the ADEA.3 4 The defendants, Max Mara and Fashion
Group, moved to dismiss Robins's age discrimination claim because
Max Mara did not employ the requisite twenty employees.135 Robins
contended that Max Mara and Fashion Group were a single entity
and, therefore, their aggregate number of employees should be used
to determine if the ADEA minimum had been met. 136 The court
noted that a subsidiary and a parent corporation may be considered
one employer under the ADEA if there is sufficient evidence that the
parent and subsidiary are an "integrated enterprise."' 37 The court
also interpreted § 623(h)(2) to require the inclusion of only the for-
eign parent's employees in the United States to determine if the statu-
tory minimum had been met.'38 In Robins, Fashion Group employed
no employees in the United States.' 39 The court, therefore, needed to
go no further in its analysis. 4 ° Even if Robins could have proven that
Max Mara and Fashion Group were an "integrated enterprise," only
Max Mara had employees in the United States.' 4'
In Robins, the court's holding had the same effect as a finding that
the ADEA did not apply to foreign corporations. The court's holding,
however, could have had a very different effect if the foreign parent
had employees in the United States. In this situation, if the foreign
parent's employees in the United States together with the U.S. subsid-
iary's employees met the threshold of twenty employees, then the for-
eign parent could have been joined in the discrimination suit and
potentially held liable for the ADEA violations. 42 The approach
used in Robins, therefore, holds foreign parents liable under the
ADEA to the extent that they are operating in the United States.
Under this approach, a foreign employer with an "integrated enter-
prise" in the United States cannot escape ADEA liability by simply
incorporating its subsidiary in the United States and maintaining less
than twenty employees in the subsidiary.
133. IL
134. Id
135. Id at 1008.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1009.
139. Id. at 1009-10.
140. Id. at 1010.
141. Id. at 1009-10.
142. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements
for joining a foreign parent in the ADEA suit).
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2. After the OAAA-Courts Interpreting the ADEA to Exempt
Foreign Employers in the United States
After enactment of the OAAA, two federal courts refused to apply
the ADEA to foreign employers in the United States.'43 In Robinson
v. Overseas Military Sales Corp.,'" Robinson, a Massachusetts resi-
dent, was hired as a sales agent to sell automobiles for Overseas Mili-
tary Sales Corporation ("OMSC"), a Swiss corporation . 45 Robinson
sold automobiles to U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea and
worked in the corporation's Woodbury, New York office.146 Robin-
son sued OMSC alleging that the company terminated him based on
his age in violation of the ADEA. 47 The court granted OMSC's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the ground that the ADEA did not
apply to foreign corporations not controlled by an American em-
ployer.148 The court found that § 623(h)(2) provided an exemption
for all foreign employers. 49
Robinson attempted to show that the ADEA covered foreign em-
ployers because the OAAA amended the definition of "employee" to
include individuals "employed by an employer in a workplace in a
foreign country."'150 The court rejected this argument, finding instead
that the amendment's legislative history showed that it was intended
solely to extend ADEA coverage to American citizens working
abroad for U.S. employers and, therefore, did not apply to this case.1 5'
Ironically, the legislative history pertaining to this amendment is the
same as that for § 623(h)(2) because the two provisions were enacted
simultaneously by the OAAA. 2 The court's use of § 623(h)(2) as an
exemption for foreign employers in the United States is questionable
given its own recognition that the OAAA were intended to extend
ADEA coverage to U.S. employers abroad.
The court in Robinson then hedged this conclusion by finding that
even if the ADEA did cover OMSC, Robinson failed to show that the
justification for his discharge was a pretext.15 3 Because Robinson
failed to establish an essential element of his ADEA claim, summary
judgment was warranted even if the ADEA applied to OMSC.'1 The
court of appeals affirmed the Robinson decision on the ground that
143. See supra note 92 (listing two cases where the courts refused to apply the
ADEA to foreign employers in the United States).
144. 827 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 21 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1994).
145. Id at 918.
146. Id
147. Id at 920.
148. Id at 920-21.
149. Id at 920.
150. Id (quoting 29 U.S.C § 630(0 (1988)).
151. Id at 921.
152. See supra part II.A (discussing the OAAA and its legislative history).
153. Robinson, 827 F. Supp. at 921.
154. Id.
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Robinson failed to state a genuine issue of material fact that the justi-
fication for his dismissal was a pretext.'5 5 The court specifically re-
fused to consider whether the ADEA applied to foreign employers in
the United States. 56
The court in Mochelle v. J. Walter Inc.,'5' interpreted § 623(h)(2) to
exclude from ADEA liability foreign parents of U.S.-incorporated
subsidiaries. 58 Mochelle sued his employer J. Walter Inc. ("Walter
Inc.") alleging that he was discharged in violation of the ADEA.159
Walter Inc. was incorporated in the United States and was the subsidi-
ary of J. Walter Company Ltd. ("Walter Ltd."), a Canadian corpora-
tion.' 60  Because Walter Inc. had less than twenty employees,
Mochelle claimed that Walter Ltd. should also be considered his em-
ployer for purposes of determining whether the ADEA's statutory
minimum had been met.' 6' The court found that Walter Ltd. and Wal-
ter Inc. were not an "integrated enterprise."' 62 In dictum, the court
noted that even if it were proven that the two companies were an
"integrated enterprise," Walter Ltd. was "exempt from ADEA liabil-
ity under 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) .... Walter Ltd. is a foreign person
not controlled by an American employer. Walter Ltd. is specifically
excluded from ADEA liability by the express language of
§ 623(h)(2).'1 63
III. REASONS THE ADEA APPLIES TO FOREIGN EMPLOYERS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Foreign employers in the United States should be held to the
ADEA's prohibitions for several reasons. First, if Congress intended
the OAAA to rescind ADEA coverage for older Americans working
for foreign employers in the United States, it would have expressly
addressed such a dramatic change which conflicts with the overall pur-
pose of the ADEA 64 and effectively sanctions age discrimination by
foreign employers in the United States. 65 The legislative history of
the OAAA, however, is completely devoid of such an intention. 66
Second, Congress expressly acknowledged the sovereignty of other
nations by tolerating non-compliance with the ADEA by U.S. em-
ployers abroad when compliance would violate the laws of the host
155. Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994).
156. Id. at 507 n.5.
157. 823 F. Supp. 1302 (M.D. La. 1993).
158. Id. at 1309.
159. Id at 1307.
160. Id at 1304.
161. Id. at 1306-08.
162. Id. at 1308.
163. Id at 1309 (footnote omitted).
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 621; Zanar, supra note 6, at 167.
165. See infra part III.A.
166. See infra part III.A.
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country. 167 This recognition of other nations' sovereignty is inconsis-
tent with Congress's complete cession of U.S. sovereignty over foreign
employers in the United States.6s Third, the EEOC, the administra-
tive agency charged with enforcing the ADEA, has interpreted the
ADEA as applicable to foreign employers in the United States.1 69 Fi-
nally, the ADEA and Title VII, which proscribes discrimination in
employment based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin,
should be applied consistently to foreign employers in the United
States. Title VII has consistently been applied to foreign employers in
the United States. 70 Allowing foreign employers in the United States
to engage in age discrimination, while prohibiting them from other
forms of discrimination, is illogical considering that the ADEA and
Title VII share the common goal of eradicating employment
discrimination. 7 '
A. The Legislative History of the OAAA
If Congress intended to strip the ADEA's protections from a sub-
stantial number of Americans, it would have discussed this intention
in the legislative history of the OAAA.12 Exempting foreign employ-
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1).
168. See infra part II.B.
169. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 3; see infra part III.C.
170. See infra part lII.D.2.
171. See infra part M.D.3.
172. The use of legislative history has garnered much criticism over the past several
years and its use by the Supreme Court to resolve issues of statutory interpretation
has declined. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Stat-
utes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 845-46 (1992); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75
B.U. L. Rev. 321, 321-22, 330-33 (1995); see also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy:
The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev.
593, 599-603 (1995) (discussing the skepticism surrounding the use of legislative his-
tory as a method of statutory interpretation). The movement away from legislative
history as an interpretive tool, however, is not universal. Breyer, supra, at 847; Taylor,
supra, at 332-33. Legislative history elucidates "the context and purpose of a statute."
Breyer, supra, at 848. Justice Breyer identified five situations in which the use of
legislative history helps courts decide difficult cases: "(1) avoiding an absurd result;
(2) preventing the law from turning on a drafting error, (3) understanding the mean-
ing of specialized terms; (4) understanding the 'reasonable purpose' a provision might
serve; and (5) choosing among several possible 'reasonable purposes' for language in
a politically controversial law." Id. at 861. This situation fits category four-under-
standing the reasonable purpose of § 623(h)(2). Because the ADEA amendments did
not "evoke[ ] strong political support and opposition in Congress," category four is
more appropriate than category five. Id. at 856; see infra part 1I.A (discussing the
legislative history of the OAAA). Legislative history helps a court determine "the
purpose a particular statutory... phrase serves within the broader context of a statu-
tory scheme in order to decide properly whether a particular circumstance falls within
[its] scope." Breyer, supra, at 853. The OAAA's legislative history focuses solely on
U.S. employers abroad and never mentions foreign employers operating in the United
States. See infra part III.A (discussing the legislative history of the OAAA). By inter-
preting § 623(h)(2) in the context of this legislative history, a court would understand
that its purpose was not to exempt foreign employers in the United States from
ADEA coverage. Additionally, the OAAA's legislative history with respect to the
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ers in the United States from the ADEA exposes older Americans to
age discrimination without legal redress in the United States, which is
completely contrary to the purpose of the ADEA.17 3 Such a dramatic
change would have warranted some discussion in Congress. The legis-
lative history of the OAAA, however, lacks any mention of this
intention.17 1
In 1983, the Subcommittee on Aging of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources held a hearing to discuss the proposed
amendments extending the ADEA's coverage extraterritorially.' 75
The focus of this hearing was the concern for older Americans work-
ing overseas for U.S. employers, a concern triggered by two federal
court decisions that denied these Americans ADEA protection. 176 In-
itially, the draft bill amended only the ADEA's definition of "em-
ployee" to include Americans working for U.S. employers overseas. 177
Clarence Thomas, then Chairman of the EEOC, testified that this
amendment was not specific enough, because it was unclear whether
this definition of "employee" also included employees of foreign cor-
porations. 78 In response, Senator Grassley, Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Aging, asked each of the witnesses to comment on the
proposed amendment. 79 William Yoffee, Executive Director of the
American Citizens Abroad, reiterated Mr. Thomas's concern explain-
ing that this definition was "overbroad" and could be construed to
encompass foreign employers, as well as U.S. employers overseas.' S0
This discussion was likely the reason for the addition of § 623(h)(2) to
the ADEA. In this hearing, neither the Subcommittee members nor
ADEA amendments is relatively straightforward and contains no significant debate
among the members of Congress. See infra part III.A (discussing the legislative his-
tory of the OAAA). Its interpretation, therefore, is less susceptible to manipulation.
See Taylor, supra, at 322-23 (discussing the manipulation of legislative history as a
reason for much of its criticism). For these reasons, the legislative history of the
OAAA is a valid basis for concluding that the ADEA applies to foreign employers in
the United States.
173. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a)(1), 621(a)(3); Zanar, supra note 6, at 167.
174. See S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27-28, 36-37, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000-01, 3009-10; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1037, supra note 17, at 49,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3037; 130 Cong. Rec. 14,205-17 (1984) (OAAA con-
sidered and passed by the Senate); 130 Cong. Rec. 23,032-36 (1984) (OAAA consid-
ered and passed by the House); 130 Cong. Rec. 26,956-64, 27,337-50 (1984) (Senate
and House agreed to a conference report); Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-48. For
a general discussion of the purpose of the ADEA amendments, see Zanar, supra note
6, at 165-66, 180-185.
175. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-2.
176. ld. at 1. The two federal cases that refused to apply the ADEA to a U.S.
employer abroad are Cleary v. United States Lines, 728 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1984),
and Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1984).
177. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 30.
178. Id. at 2, 5.
179. Id at 30.
180. Id at 23, 32.
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the witnesses discussed the applicability of the ADEA to foreign em-
ployers in the United States.18'
In the Senate Report, Congress stated that the purpose of the
OAAA was "to insure that the citizens of the United States who are
employed in a foreign workplace by U.S. corporations or their subsidi-
aries enjoy the protections of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.' 1  To clarify the scope of these amendments, Congress ex-
plained that the ADEA "appl[ies] only to citizens of the United States
who are working for U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries. It does
not apply to foreign nationals working for such corporations in a for-
eign workplace and it does not apply to foreign companies which are
not controlled by U.S. firms. '' 183 While discussing the bill in the Sen-
ate, Senator Grassley stated that the purpose of the OAAA was to
[C]lose a loophole recently created by several court decisions...
[and] bring under the provisions of the [ADEA] Americans work-
ing abroad for American companies. These court decisions heed
that it was not the intention of Congress when it passed the ADEA
to cover such persons. I think that my colleagues will agree that this
class of American citizens should not be treated differently than other
Americans by this laiv.
184
The legislative history of the OAAA focuses on the concern for U.S.
citizens who are discriminated against by U.S. employers overseas and
does not mention foreign employers operating in the United States.'8
The OAAA's legislative history repeatedly discusses the goal of ex-
tending the ADEA extraterritorially.'8 6 The elimination of ADEA
protection for Americans employed by foreign employers in the
United States is an equally significant issue. The legislative history
also specifically states the intention not to infringe on the sovereignty
of other nations.)' In light of the legislative history, § 623(h)(2) of
the ADEA should be interpreted as Congress's express respect for
other nations' sovereignty. Congress wanted to make absolutely clear
that the ADEA should cover only American citizens working for U.S.
employers abroad and not those working for foreign companies
abroad.
181. See id. at 1-48.
182. S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000.
183. Id. at 27-28.
184. 130 Cong. Rec. 14,213 (1984) (emphasis added).
185. See supra note 174 (listing the OAAA's legislative history that pertains to the
ADEA amendments).
186. See supra note 174 (listing the OAAA's legislative history that pertains to the
ADEA amendments).
187. S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27-28, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000-
01.
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B. Sovereignty over Foreign Employers in the United States
Congress would not cede U.S. sovereignty over foreign employers
in the United States without a compelling reason. In extending the
ADEA to U.S. employers abroad, Congress was concerned about
other nations' potentially conflicting labor laws.18 Congress specifi-
cally addressed this concern by allowing a U.S. employer to avoid
compliance with the ADEA if compliance would violate the laws of its
host country.'8 9 In the Senate Report, Congress reiterated its respect
for the sovereignty of other nations: "[N]o nation has the right to
impose its labor standards on another country." 90 With such explicit
recognition of other nations' sovereignty, Congress would not have
ceded U.S. sovereignty over foreign employers in the United States.
The court in Helm v. South African Airways' 91 recognized this incon-
sistency: "It is inconceivable that Congress intended to respect the
sovereignty of other nations and abandon that of the United States by
subjecting American citizens, working inside the United States, to for-
eign law."'"
By ceding U.S. sovereignty over foreign employers in the United
States, Congress would leave countless older Americans vulnerable to
age discrimination without legal redress in the United States. This
contradicts not only the purpose of the ADEA, but also the goal of
the OAAA. The OAAA were intended to increase the protection of
Americans from age discrimination by extending the ADEA's cover-
age to U.S. employers abroad.193 Congress would not in one breath
exercise U.S. sovereignty over Americans working for U.S. employers
abroad and, in the next, relinquish U.S. sovereignty over Americans
working for foreign employers in the United States.' 94
188. Id.; see Street, supra note 2, at 366.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). After amendment, the applicable part of § 623(0(1)
now provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer.., to take any action otherwise
prohibited under [the ADEA] ... where such practices involve an employee
in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with [the ADEA] would
cause such employer, or corporation controlled by such employer, to violate
the laws of the country in which such workplace is located.
Id.
190. S. Rep. No. 467, supra note 6, at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000.
191. No. 84 Civ. 5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that the
OAAA did not exempt foreign employers from the ADEA).
192. Id. at *7.
193. See supra part II.A (discussing the OAAA and its purpose).
194. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 6 (commenting that "[i]t is difficult to imagine that
Congress, already concerned that American employers might attempt to evade the
ADEA by employing American workers abroad through foreign subsidiaries, would
permit foreign employers to evade the ADEA with respect to American workers in
this country").
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C. The EEOC's Policy Guidance
The EEOC, the administrative agency charged with enforcing the
ADEA, issues policy guidance interpreting the provisions of the
ADEA.9 5 The EEOC issued a policy guidance in March 1989, stating
that the ADEA applied to foreign employers in the United States.'9
The EEOC recognized that foreign employers in the United States
enjoy many benefits of American law and, therefore, should also be
subject to the prohibitions of American employment laws.' 97 Prior to
issuing this interpretation, the Department of Labor, the EEOC's
predecessor, deemed the geographic scope of the ADEA to encom-
pass "places over which the United States has sovereignty, territorial
jurisdiction, or legislative control .... Activities within such geo-
graphical areas which are discriminatory against protected individuals
or employees are within the scope of the [ADEA] even though the
activities are related to employment outside of such geographical ar-
eas.' 1 9 8 Thus, according to both the EEOC and its predecessor, the
Department of Labor, the ADEA has always applied to all employers
operating within the boundaries of the United States. 99
1. Standards for Determining Whether the EEOC's Interpretation
Is Entitled to Judicial Deference
The degree of judicial deference to be given EEOC interpretations
of the statutes it enforces is unclear.'0 The Supreme Court has devel-
oped two approaches to determine the degree of deference to be
given to administrative agencies' interpretations. 0' The first approach
was adopted in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,20 2 where the Court consid-
ered the level of deference that should be afforded an interpretation
of the FLSA by its Administrator.20 3 The Court concluded that
although the interpretation was not controlling, it should be treated
with persuasive value.2' The level of persuasive value depended
upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
195. 1 Eglit, supra note 1, § 2.03, at 2-12.
196. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 3; see Maher, supra note 2, at 31.
197. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 3-4.
198. 29 C.F.R. § 860.20 (1984). The Department of Labor was the agency charged
with enforcing the ADEA before authority to enforce the ADEA was transferred to
the EEOC in 1979. 1 Eglit, supra note 1, at § 2.03, at 2-10 to 2-11.
199. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.20 (1984); EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 3;
O'Meara, supra note 6, at 59 (stating that the ADEA applies to all employers, foreign
and domestic, working within the territorial borders of the United States).
200. White, supra note 34, at 54-55.
201. Id at 58.
202. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
203. Id. at 136; White, supra note 34, at 71-72.
204. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chev-
ron, 58 Mo. L. Rev. 129, 129-30 (1993); White, supra note 34, at 72-74.
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all those factors which give it power to persuade. 20 5 The second ap-
proach was adopted by the Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,"06 which "called for increased judi-
cial deference to agency statutory interpretations. 2 0 7 In Chevron, the
Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's interpreta-
tion of the definition of a term in the Clean Air Act.2 08 In doing so,
the Court adopted a two step inquiry to determine if the agency's in-
terpretation was entitled to deference.0 9 First, if Congress has di-
rectly spoken on the precise issue within the statue, then a court must
defer to "the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 2 10  If,
however, Congress has not specifically addressed the issue, then a
court must determine if the administrative agency's interpretation "is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."12 1' A statutory
construction is permissible if it is not "arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute. 2 12 Such an interpretation should then
be given controlling weight by a court.2 13
After Chevron, the Supreme Court applied both the Chevron and
Skidmore standards to EEOC interpretations. 14 In EEOC v. Com-
mercial Office Products Co.,215 the Court, using the Chevron standard,
deferred to the EEOC's interpretation of a Title VII provision involv-
ing the time limit for filing a discrimination charge. 16 In applying the
Chevron standard, the Court stated that the "EEOC's interpretation
of Title VII... need not be the best one by grammatical or any other
standards. Rather, [its] interpretation of ambiguous language need
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. 2 17 The Court found
the EEOC's interpretation reasonable because it was supported by
the legislative history, the purpose of the provision, and the other Title
VII provisions.2 18
In Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 19 the Court was
faced with an EEOC interpretation of an ADEA provision that ex-
empted from ADEA coverage certain age-based employment deci-
sions with respect to employee benefit plans.22 0 The EEOC argued
205. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see White, supra note 34, at 72.
206. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
207. White, supra note 34, at 72-73; see Weaver, supra note 204, at 129-30.
208. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40, 866.
209. Id at 842-43.
210. Id.; see Weaver, supra note 204, at 134.
211. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
212. Id at 844; Weaver, supra note 204, at 134.
213. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Weaver, supra note 204, at 134.
214. White, supra note 34, at 54, 71-76.
215. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
216. Il at 109-10, 115; see White, supra note 34, at 73-75.
217. Commercial Office Products, 486 U.S. at 115.
218. Id at 115-16.
219. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
220. Id. at 161, 170.
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that its interpretation was entitled to deference under Chevron.2
The Court, however, did not defer to the EEOC's interpretation be-
cause it was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.' Still,
the Court did not oppose the EEOC's assertion that its interpretation
was entitled to deference under Chevron."m
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 4 ("ARAMCO"), the
Court, using the Skidmore standard, concluded that an EEOC inter-
pretation of Title VII's applicability to U.S. employers abroad was en-
titled to only persuasive value.?2 The Court further found that this
interpretation's persuasive value was limited because it contradicted
the EEOC's earlier position and was not issued contemporaneously
with the statute's enactment.226 Justice Scalia concurred in the
ARAMCO judgment, but disagreed with the majority's application of
the Skidmore standard, rather than the Chevron standard.2 Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens dissented, arguing that the Chevron
standard should apply and that the Court, therefore, should defer the
EEOC's interpretation.'
After the ARAMCO decision, the Court once again considered the
degree of deference to afford EEOC interpretations in Gregory v.
Ashcroft.229 In this case, the Court refused to defer to the EEOC's
interpretation that the ADEA covered appointed judges?230 The
EEOC interpretation, however, was merely its litigation position and
was never manifested in a guideline or opinion2 31 While the majority
did not address the issue of deference, Justice White, in a concurring
opinion, stated that the EEOC's position was not entitled to any spe-
cial deference because it was merely its litigation position.23- He fur-
ther contended that the EEOC's position was inconsistent with the
plain language of the statute and, therefore, was not entitled to defer-
ence. 33 Justices Blackmun and Marshall dissented and, as in
ARAMCO, argued that the EEOC's interpretation should be afforded
Chevron deference?2
221. hL at 171; see White, supra note 34, at 74.
222. Betts, 492 U.S. at 171-72; see White, supra note 34, at 74.
223. See supra note 222.
224. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
225. 1L at 257-58; see White, supra note 34, at 74.
226. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 257-58; see White, supra note 34, at 74-75.
227. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
228. Id at 275-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
229. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
230. Id at 485 n.3 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the EEOC interpretation was
not entitled to deference because it was not embodied in a formal guideline or opin-
ion, but was rather the EEOC's litigation position in this case).
231. Id
232. Id
233. Id
234. Id at 493-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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2. Judicial Deference to Be Accorded the EEOC's Interpretation
of the Applicability of the ADEA to Foreign Employers
in the United States
Whether the EEOC's interpretation that the ADEA applies to for-
eign employers in the United States should be accorded Chevron def-
erence or the more limited Skidmore deference is unclear.235 For
several reasons, a court would likely find that the EEOC's interpreta-
tion is entitled to Chevron deference. The Court in ARAMCO ap-
plied the Skidmore standard to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
because "Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the
EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations. 236 Unlike the
EEOC's authority to enact only procedural regulations under Title
VII, the EEOC has substantive as well as procedural rule-making au-
thority for the ADEA.2 37 This distinction favors applying the Chev-
ron standard to the EEOC's interpretations of the ADEA.23 s In
addition, the EEOC's interpretation with respect to foreign employers
in the United States is a formal policy guidance, unlike the interpreta-
tions in ARAMCO and Gregory, which were expressed in a less for-
mal opinion letter and as a litigation position, respectively.3 9 Even if
a court were to apply the more limited Skidmore standard, the
EEOC's interpretation with respect to foreign employers in the
United States is still significantly persuasive because it is well-rea-
soned and consistent with earlier positions in this area.24 °
The court in EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd.24 1 applied the Chevron
standard and found that the EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA as
applicable against foreign employers in the United States deserved
meaningful deference. 242 The court in Kloster Cruise found that
§ 623(h)(2) was ambiguous because if this section were read liter-
ally-exempting all foreign employers in the United States from
ADEA coverage-it would not comport with the purpose of the
ADEA amendments.243 As the court noted, "[t]he sole expressed
purpose of the OAAA's amendments of the ADEA was to extend the
scope of the ADEA, not to carve out an entire class of employers for
235. See supra part III.C.1; White, supra note 34, at 54-55.
236. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (quoting Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
237. See 29 U.S.C. § 628; White, supra note 34, at 68-69.
238. See White, supra note 34, at 88-92 (arguing that courts should accord Chevron
deference to the EEOC's interpretations of the ADEA and, therefore, be bound by
these interpretations).
239. See ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 256-57; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 485 n.3
(1991) (White, J., concurring).
240. See infra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
241. 888 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
242. Id. at 149-52. The court in Kloster Cruise concluded that that the ADEA ap-
plied to a foreign corporation that employed a U.S. citizen in its Florida subsidiary.
Id. at 151-52.
243. Id at 151.
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complete insulation from the ADEA."24 In addition, the court found
that the ADEA would be internally inconsistent if it recognized the
sovereignty of foreign nations as it did in § 623(f)(1), but then relin-
quished sovereignty over foreign employers operating in the United
States.245 The court concluded that the EEOC's interpretation was
reasonable, because it "square[d] with the purpose and context of the
OAAA, [was] consonant with the OAAA's legislative history, and
d[id] not unnecessarily poke a gaping hole in the ADEA. '11 6
If, however, a court decides that the Chevron standard does not ap-
ply to the EEOC's interpretation, it should nonetheless find that the
interpretation is of significant persuasive value. Under the Skidmore
approach, the persuasive value of an interpretation is dependent on
"the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea-
soning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments." 247 The thoroughness of the EEOC's consideration for this
interpretation is evidenced by its manifestation in a policy guidance; it
is not merely a litigation position or an amicus brief. 248 Furthermore,
the EEOC's policy guidance is well-reasoned given the legislative his-
tory and the other ADEA amendments. 24 9 The EEOC's interpreta-
tion of § 623(h)(2) as limiting the extension of the ADEA
extraterritorially is more conservative than the alternative interpreta-
tion that § 623(h)(2) exempts all foreign employers from the ADEA.
Under the latter interpretation, U.S. sovereignty is abrogated over an
entire class of employers-all foreign employers operating within the
United States. In addition, the EEOC's interpretation is consistent
with its earlier pronouncements. 50 The EEOC's position both before
and after the OAAA was that the ADEA protects all employees
working within the United States."' The EEOC's interpretation,
therefore, is of significant persuasive value and deserves substantial
judicial deference.
D. The ADEA and Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,251 which prohibits discrim-
ination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
should be applied consistently with the ADEA with regard to foreign
244. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
245. Id.
246. It. at 151-52.
247. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see White, supra note 34, at
72.
248. See EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 3.
249. See supra parts HI.A (arguing that the OAAA's legislative history supports
the application of the ADEA to foreign employers in the United States).
250. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.20 (1984).
251. For the EEOC's position before the OAAA, see id. For the EEOC's position
after the OAAA, see EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 19, at 3.
252. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
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employers in the United States. Title VII and the ADEA share the
common goal of preventing employment discrimination. 53 Title VII
was amended in 1991 to extend its protections to U.S. citizens working
for U.S. employers abroad.254 The amendments were almost identical
to those made to the ADEA by the OAAA.255 Congress explicitly
recognized their similarity when it passed the Title VII amend-
ments.256 Prior to its amendment in 1991, courts applied Title VII to
foreign employers in the United States.25 7 After its amendment,
courts continued to interpret Title VII as applicable to foreign em-
ployers in the United States.258 Courts did not interpret the Title VII
amendments to exempt foreign employers in the United States, as two
federal courts did for the ADEA amendments.25 9 Inconsistency in in-
terpreting the ADEA and Title VII with respect to foreign employers
in the United States is inappropriate given the similarity of the
amendments made to the two statutes. In addition, allowing foreign
253. See 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a
Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1093, 1096-97 (1993) [hereinafter Eglit, Three
Acts].
254. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17); see David A. Cathcart et al., The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 1.08, at 46-51 (1993).
255. See infra part III.D.1.
256. See 137 Cong. Rec. H9547 (1991) (documenting the section-by-section analysis
of the bill read into the record after the House passed it).
257. See Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (finding that foreign parent of U.S. subsidiary was also plaintiffs employer
within the meaning of Title VII and therefore could be joined in the action); Ward v.
W & H Voortman, Ltd., 685 F. Supp. 231, 233 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (holding that "any
company, foreign or domestic, that elects to do business in this country falls within
Title VII's reach"); EEOC v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1109, 1112-13
(M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that Title VII applies to a foreign-flagged ship that alleg-
edly discriminated against an American who sought employment on the ship from its
Miami office); see also Cathcart, supra note 254, § 1.08(c), at 49 (stating that foreign
companies operating in the United States are generally subject to Title VII for deci-
sions affecting U.S. employees); Gladstone, supra note 2, at 20 (stating that courts
have generally held foreign employers in the United States to Title VII's
prohibitions).
258. See, e.g., Kim v. Dial Service Int'l, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3327 (DLC), 1997 WL
5902, at *3 (S.D.N.Y, Jan. 8, 1997) (finding that a foreign parent of a U.S. subsidiary
could be joined in the Title VII claim if the plaintiff could prove that the parent and
subsidiary were an "integrated enterprise" and together employed the statutory mini-
mum of 15 employees in the United States); Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 914 F.
Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Rao v. Kenya Airways, Ltd., No. 94 Civ.
6103 (CSH), 1995 WL 366305, at *2 (S.D.N.Y June 20, 1995) (same); see also Cath-
cart, supra note 254, § 1.08(c), at 49 (stating that foreign companies operating in the
United States are generally subject to Title VII for decisions affecting U.S. employ-
ees); Gladstone, supra note 2, at 20 (stating that it is "well established that Title VII's
prohibition of employment discrimination extends to foreign-owned businesses which
operate within the United States").
259. See supra note 92 for the two federal courts that exempted foreign employers
in the United States from ADEA coverage and supra note 258 for the application of
Title VII to foreign employers in the United States after its amendment.
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employers in the United States to engage in age discrimination, while
simultaneously prohibiting them from other forms of discrimination,
is simply illogical.2 0
1. Extension of Title VII to U.S. Employers Abroad
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.161 In 1991, the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co.262 ("ARAMCO") held that the protections of Title VII did not
follow American citizens abroad working for U.S. employers. 6 3 In
response to this decision, Congress amended Title VII with the Civil
Rights Act of 19912 to "extend[ ] the protections of Title VII...
extraterritorially. ''265 These amendments were identical in all material
respects to those made to the ADEA in 1984.2" Congress even ac-
knowledged that it "adopt[ed] the same language as the ADEA to
achieve this end."'267
Prior to its amendment in 1991, Title VII defined an employee as
"an individual employed by an employer."' 6 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 amended the definition of "employee" by adding: "With respect
to employment in a foreign country, [the term employee] includes an
individual who is a citizen of the United States."" 9 The OAAA made
260. See infra part III.D.3 (discussing the reasons that the ADEA and Title VII
should be applied consistently to foreign employers in the United States).
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17.
262. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
263. Id. at 259. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the ARAMCO case, see
Maher, supra note 2, at 7-26.
264. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
265. 137 Cong. Rec. H9547 (1991) (documenting the section-by-section analysis of
the bill, read into record after the House passed it); see 137 Cong. Rec. S15,235 (1991)
(Senator Kennedy stating that the purposes of these amendments were to overrule
the Supreme Court's decision in ARAMCO and to extend Title VII's protections to
American citizens working abroad for U.S. employers); Cathcart, supra note 254,
§ 1.08 at 46 (stating that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 nullified the ARAMCO deci-
sion); Maher, supra note 2, at 28 (stating the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
was to expand the scope of Title VII in response to recent Supreme Court decisions).
266. See infra notes 270-80 and accompanying text; Maher, supra note 2, at 29.
267. See 137 Cong. Rec. H9547 (1991) (documenting the section-by-section analysis
of the bill, read into record after the House passed it); 137 Cong. Rec. S15,235 (1991)
(Senator Kennedy stating that the Title VII amendments paralleled the OAAA
amendments to the ADEA which were enacted to achieve a similar protection for
older Americans).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). This definition excludes elected officials of any state or
its political subdivision, unless such individuals are subject to the civil service laws of
the state government or political subdivision. Id
269. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(a), 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f)); see Cathcart, supra note 254, § 108(a), at 46; Maher, supra note 2,
at 29.
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a similar change to the ADEA.27 ° Title VII's definition of "em-
ployer" was not changed by the 1991 amendments, thereby remaining
"a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."'271 This
definition of "employer" is essentially the same as the ADEA's, ex-
cept the ADEA requires a minimum of twenty employees rather than
fifteen.272
In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added subsections (b) and
(c) to § 2000e-1.273 Section 2000e-1(b) provides that a U.S. employer
in a foreign location need not comply with Title VII if compliance
would violate foreign law.2 74 This subsection is the equivalent of
§ 623(f) of the ADEA.27 5 Section 2000e-1(c) has three subsections.276
The first creates a presumption that ADEA violations by a foreign
employer controlled by a U.S. employer are violations of the U.S. em-
ployer.277 The second subsection of § 2000e-1(c) states that Title VII
does not apply to foreign operations controlled by foreign employ-
ers.278 The third subsection of § 2000e-1(c) contains a four part test
that determines whether an employer controls another corporation.279
The three subsections of § 2000e-1(c) of Title VII parallel § 623(h) of
the ADEA, which was added to the ADEA by the OAAA.280
270. The ADEA's definition of employee was amended by adding the following:
"The term 'employee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the United States
employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." Older Americans Act
Amendments § 802(a), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C § 630(0).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
272. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
273. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(b)(1), 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(b), 2000e-1(c)).
274. Id (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b)); see Cathcart, supra note
254, § 1.08(a) at 47; Maher, supra note 2, at 29.
275. Older Americans Act Amendments § 802(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 1792 (codified as
amended in 29 U.S.C. § 623(0). 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 was amended in 1984 to provide
the same exemption for employers employing American citizens in foreign locations.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
276. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(b)(1), 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(1) to (3)).
277. Id (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(1)); see Cathcart, supra
note 254, § 1.08(a), at 47; Maher, supra note 2, at 28.
278. Id (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(2)); see Cathcart, supra
note 254, § 1.08(a), at 47.
279. Id (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(3)). The four part test is
exactly the same as that in 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) of the ADEA. The four factors consid-
ered are: "(A) the interrelations of operations; (B) the common management; (C)
the centralized control of labor relations; and (D) the common ownership or financial
control." Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(3); Cathcart, supra note 254, § 108(a), at 47;
Maher, supra note 2, at 29.
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c); 29 U.S.C. § 623(h).
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2. Title VII Applies to Foreign Employers in the United States
Title VII has consistently been applied to foreign employers in the
United States both prior to and after its amendment in 1991.18 Prior
to Title VII's amendment in 1991, the court in Ward v. W & H
Voortman, Ltd22 specifically addressed the issue of whether Title VII
applied to a foreign employer operating in the United States. Ward
alleged that W & H Voortman ("Voortman"), a Canadian corpora-
tion, revoked an offer of employment in its Alabama distribution fa-
cility because of her sex in violation of Title VII.3 The court held
that foreign employers operating in the United States are subject to
the prohibitions of Title VII -s4 The court found that it "would be
simply illogical to limit the Act's protective reach to only those Amer-
ican employees who work for a domestic entity and to leave open for
victimization those employees in the country's workplace who work
for companies that happen to be foreign-owned."'
Prior to Title VII's amendment, the Supreme Court in Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,7 stated in dictum that FCN Treaty
rights could be used as a defense to Title VII claims only by foreign
employers operating in the United States.3 7 In Sumitomo, Avagliano
alleged that her employer, Sumitomo Shoji America, discriminated
against her based on her sex in violation of Title VII.3 Sumitomo
Shoji America was incorporated in New York and a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Sumitomo Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, a Japanese com-
pany. 9 Although Sumitomo Shoji America attempted to use Article
III(1) of the FCN Treaty29 between the United States and Japan as a
defense, the Court found that the FCN Treaty could not be invoked as
a defense by a company incorporated under the laws of the United
States.29 In dictum, the court stated that the FCN treaty rights were
available as a defense to Title VII claims only to Japanese companies
281. For application of Title VII to foreign employers in the United States prior to
its amendment in 1991, see supra note 257 and accompanying text. For application of
Title VII to foreign employers in the United States after its amendment in 1991, see
supra note 258 and accompanying text. See Cathcart, supra note 254, § 1.08(c), at 49-
50; Gladstone, supra note 2, at 20.
282. 685 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
283. Id. at 231.
284. Id. at 232.
285. Id
286. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
287. See id. at 183, 189.
288. Id. at 178.
289. Id
290. Article VIII(1) of the Japanese FCN Treaty provides, in part, "[njationals and
companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the
other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys,
agents and other specialists of their choice." Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070.
291. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 179, 182-83. In arriving at this conclusion, the court
relied on the definition of "companies" in Article XXII(3) of the FCN Treaty:
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operating in the United States."g The Court, therefore, assumed that
Title VII was applicable to foreign employers operating subsidiaries
incorporated outside of the United States. Foreign employers in the
United States would not need a defense to Title VII claims unless they
could be held liable under Title VII in the first place.
After Title VII's 1991 amendment, courts also applied its provisions
to foreign employers operating in the United States. 9 3 In Robins v.
Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc. ,294 Robins worked for Max Mara USA ("Max
Mara"), a Delaware corporation that was wholly-owned by Max Mara
Fashion Group, SpA ("Fashion Group"), an Italian corporation.9 5
Robins claimed that he was discriminated against based on his na-
tional origin in violation of Title VII and based on his age in violation
of the ADEA.z96 The defendants, Max Mara and Fashion Group,
moved to dismiss Robins's Title VII claim on the ground that Max
Mara did not employ the requisite fifteen employees."9 Robins con-
tended that Max Mara and Fashion Group were a single entity and,
therefore, their aggregate number of employees should be used to de-
termine if Title VII's minimum had been met.298 The court found that
Fashion Group could be held liable under Title VII if Robins could
prove that Max Mara and Fashion Group were an "integrated enter-
prise" and if combined the two met the statutory minimum of fifteen
employees.2 99 The court interpreted § 2000e-1(c)(2) to require the in-
clusion of only the foreign parent's employees located in the United
States to determine if the minimum had been met.00 In Robins, Fash-
ion Group had no employees in the United States and, therefore, the
statutory minimum was not met.3 i The approach used to reach the
foreign parent in Robins demonstrates the court's intention to hold a
foreign employer to Title VII's prohibitions to the extent that it oper-
ates in the United States.
[C]orporations, partnerships, companies and other associations, whether or
not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit. Compa-
nies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territo-
ries of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have theirjuridical status recognized within the territories of the other Party.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art.
XXII(3), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2079-80.
292. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 183.
293. See supra note 258 (listing cases in which Title VII was applied to foreign em-
ployers in the United States after its amendment in 1991).
294. 914 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
295. Id. at 1007.
296. Id. For a discussion of the ADEA claim in this case, see text accompanying
supra notes 131-41.
297. Robins, 914 F. Supp. at 1008.
298. Id
299. Id. For a discussion of the "integrated enterprise" doctrine, see supra notes
126-28 and accompanying text.
300. Robins, 914 F. Supp. at 1009.
301. Id. at 1009-10.
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3. Application of the ADEA and Title VII to Foreign Employers
in the United States
Courts have frequently recognized the similarities of Title VII and
the ADEA.3° Title VII and the ADEA share the common goal of
protecting Americans from employment discrimination. 3  Courts
have often relied on one to interpret the other.3° '  Inconsistency in
their application to foreign employers in the United States is inappro-
priate and counter to their shared goal.3 5 Protecting Americans from
302. See, e.g., Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1996)
(turning to the ADEA to determine if Title VII claims were subject to mandatory
arbitration, because the two statutes are similar and both are enforced by the EEOC);
Martin v. United Way of Erie, 829 F.2d 445, 448 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987) (turning to Title
VII to determine the definition of "industry affecting commerce" under the ADEA
because of the similarity of the statutes); see also Eglit, Three Acts, supra note 253, at
1096-97 (describing the ADEA and Title VII as having a common purpose and "iden-
tical core proscriptive language," and stating that their similarity has been "strength-
ened by the on-going development of common doctrine").
Although the ADEA and Title VII have many similarities, they differ with respect
to some of their enforcement provisions. See O'Meara, supra note 6. at 82-96. When
the ADEA was originally enacted, the Department of Labor was the agency responsi-
ble for its enforcement until this authority was transferred to the EEOC in 1979. See
supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. The EEOC, however, has always been the
agency responsible for the enforcement of Title VII. White, supra note 34, at 58-59.
Because the Department of Labor was also charged with enforcing the FLSA, Con-
gress incorporated many of the FLSA's procedures and remedies into the ADEA to
enhance administrative efficiency. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); O'Meara, supra note 6, at 82-
83. Courts, therefore, are supposed to rely on the applicable FLSA procedures and
remedies if they have been incorporated into the ADEA. O'Meara, supra note 6, at
82-84. The continued use of the FLSA enforcement provisions has been criticized
because the EEOC now enforces the ADEA and, therefore, no administrative effi-
ciency can be gained. Id Furthermore, the purpose and provisions of the ADEA are
more closely aligned with Title VII. ld. For these reasons, courts have often ignored
the FLSA enforcement provisions, and instead have turned to comparable provisions
in Title VII. Id The FLSA does not specifically address foreign employers in the
United States. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. Thus, a comparison of
the ADEA to the FLSA is not undertaken in this Note.
303. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Eglit, Three Acts, supra note
253, at 1096.
304. Eglit, Three Acts, supra note 253, at 1097-101; see supra note 302.
305. A similar inconsistency arose in the application of the ADEA and Title VII to
U.S. employers abroad. In 1984, the OAAA extended ADEA coverage to American
citizens working overseas for U.S. employers. See infra part II.A. In 1991, the
Supreme Court held that Title VII did not cover American citizens working for U.S.
employers in a foreign workplace. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259
(1991). Later that same year, Congress amended Title VII requiring its application to
U.S. employers abroad. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109, 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17). Thus, prior to its amendment, the scope
of the ADEA and Title VII was inconsistent with respect to American citizens work-
ing for U.S. employers abroad. Reacting to this inconsistency, one commentator
noted that "[]t is not logically consistent for two fair employment statutes as similar
as the ADEA and Title VII to have inconsistent extraterritorial application." David
M. Barbash, Note, Same Boss, Different Rules: An Argument for Extraterritorial Ex-
tension of Title VII to Protect U.S. Citizens Employed Abroad by U.S. Multinational
Corporations, 30 Va. J. Int'l L. 479, 513 (1990). He further noted that it was unfair to
protect U.S. citizens employed abroad from age discrimination, but not other forms of
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employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and na-
tional origin, while exposing them to age discrimination is unjusti-
fied. 30 6 The eradication of age discrimination should be no less of a
priority than combating other forms of employment discrimination. 7
The amendments to extend Title VII's protections to U.S. employ-
ers abroad were almost identical to the OAAA. °8 Congress even ex-
pressed its intention of adopting the language in the ADEA to extend
Title VII extraterritorially.319 The only potentially significant differ-
ence is between § 623(h)(2) of the ADEA and § 2000e-1(c)(2) of Title
VII. Section 2000e-1(c)(2) provides that Title VII does not apply
"with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a foreign
person not controlled by an American employer. '310  Section
623(h)(2) of the ADEA provides that the ADEA does not apply
"where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an Ameri-
can employer."'311 The ADEA, unlike Title VII, does not refer to the
"foreign operations" of a foreign employer. 312 Congress could not
have intended with this one phrase, however, to distinguish the appli-
cability of Title VII from the ADEA with respect to foreign employ-
ers in the United States. The legislative histories of the Title VII
amendments and the ADEA amendments express identical inten-
tions-extension of protection to Americans working for U.S. em-
ployers abroad-and neither mentions foreign employers in the
United States.313 If Congress had intended to strip older Americans
working for foreign employers in the United States of the ADEA's
protections, it would have done more than merely withholding this
one phrase from § 623(h)(2) of the ADEA.
CONCLUSION
Older Americans working for foreign employers in the United
States deserve the same protection from age discrimination in employ-
ment as those working for U.S. employers in the United States and
discrimination. Id. Another commentator found it surprising that Title VII and the
ADEA were "non co-extensive in their overseas application" given the complemen-
tary nature of the two statutes. Maher, supra note 2, at 3.
306. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 9. (Steven Kartzman, attorney who repre-
sented the plaintiff in Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984),
stating that the application of Title VII, but not the ADEA, to U.S. employers abroad
"defies logic").
307. ld. (Steven Kartzman, attorney who represented the plaintiff in Cleary, 728
F.2d 607, stating that "[c]ertainly age discrimination is no less poisonous or wasteful
to society than discrimination based on race, color, [or] religion").
308. See supra part III.D.1.
309. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
310. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(2) (emphasis added).
311. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2).
312. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2).
313. For the legislative history of the Title VII amendments, see supra note 267.
For the legislative history of the ADEA amendments, see supra note 174.
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abroad. Foreign employers in the United States, therefore, should be
held to the ADEA's prohibitions. If Congress intended to expose
countless older Americans to age discrimination from foreign employ-
ers in the United States, it would have mentioned this intention. No-
where in the legislative history of the OAAA does it mention such an
intention. In addition, Congress's recognition of other nations' sover-
eignty in the OAAA is inconsistent with a concession of U.S. sover-
eignty over foreign employers in the United States. The extension of
the ADEA extraterritoriaUy shows that Congress intended to bring as
many Americans as possible within the reach of the ADEA. In this
same enactment, Congress would not implicitly strip ADEA protec-
tion from older Americans working in the United States for foreign
employers. Additionally, the EEOC, the agency charged with enforc-
ing the ADEA, supports application of the ADEA to foreign employ-
ers in the United States. Finally, the scope of Title VII and the
ADEA should be consistent because the two statutes are similar in
construction and purpose, and courts have consistently applied Title
VII to foreign employers in the United States. Age discrimination in
the workplace is equally offensive and, therefore, should be prevented
with equal force and breadth.
1997] 2569

